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Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd and the 
Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Material
Katie Murray*
The recent unanimous decision of the High Court of Australia in Expense Reduction Analysts 
Group Pty Ltd v Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd1 emphasises the 
need for lawyers (and courts) to take a less zealous and more proactive2 approach to the 
inadvertent disclosure of privileged material, in order to avoid ‘unduly technical and costly 
disputes about non-essential issues’.3 The High Court also took the opportunity to high-
light the self-evident nature of Rule 31 of the new Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules,4 
which effectively provides that a solicitor who receives documents known or suspected to 
be confidential should return them to the party from whom they were received. 
Expense Reduction Analysts involved discovery proceedings during a contractual dispute 
between the respondent ‘Armstrong parties’ and appellant parties in the ERA group. It 
ended time-consuming and costly proceedings about whether 13 documents inadvertently 
disclosed to Armstrong’s solicitors, Marque Lawyers, by ERA’s solicitors, Norton Rose, 
should be returned to ERA. 
The inadvertent disclosure resulted, in part, because Norton Rose used an electronic 
database to collate and categorise their clients’ documents during a court-ordered process 
of discovery under the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (‘UCPR’). Documents 
in the database were listed in the non-privileged section of the List of Documents by default, 
*  Lecturer, School of Law and Justice, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, Australia.
1 [2013] HCA 46.
2 Rather than zealously pursuing every possible advantage, the Court found that the parties and their lawyers 
had a ‘positive duty’ to resolve their dispute in a just, cost and time-effective manner in accordance with the 
purpose of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (paras 64 and 3).
3 para 57 of the judgment. 
4 In force in Queensland and South Australia and proposed to be adopted in New South Wales at the time of the 
decision (para 65). 
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unless the lawyers reviewing and entering the documents selected either ‘yes’ or ‘part’ to the 
question of privilege. Nine documents (out of approximately 60,000 discovered by ERA)5 
were mistakenly classified and listed in both the ‘privileged’ and ‘non-privileged’ sections 
of the List delivered to Marque Lawyers, and four documents for which privilege might 
otherwise have been claimed were listed in the ‘non-privileged’ section.6 
Although the lawyers initially reviewing and entering the documents into the electronic 
database were ‘not very experienced’,7 criticism was not levelled at them or Norton Rose. 
The High Court acknowledged that mistakes can be made (particularly in large commercial 
cases)—despite reasonable precautions being taken.8 
ERA had instructed Norton Rose to claim privilege for all documents for which it could 
be claimed. When the error was discovered, Norton Rose promptly sought the return of 
the documents and an undertaking that they would not be relied on—whether in the 
proceedings or otherwise.9 Armstrong refused, arguing that any privilege attaching to the 
documents had been waived by their inadvertent disclosure. 
The High Court thought that the lawyers, and to an extent the lower courts, had wasted 
time and money unnecessarily arguing and determining discrete points of equity and issues 
‘tangential’10 to the real matters in dispute between the parties. In the High Court’s view, 
the lower courts simply should have amended the List of Documents under their powers to 
facilitate the purpose of the UCPR legislation; namely the ‘just, quick and cheap’11 resolution 
of disputes.12 Before this reached Australia’s highest court, there had been ‘substantial’13 and 
costly litigation about the waiver of privilege in the New South Wales courts. This litigation 
had concentrated on evidence that a mistake had been made, whether Norton Rose made 
a continuing intention to claim privilege,14 and whether an injunction could be granted 
against the Armstrong parties to protect confidential information.15 However, the High 
5 para 8. 
6 paras 8 and 18. 
7 para 9.
8 The Court quoted Lawrence Collins J in ISTIL Group Inc v Zahoor [2003] 2 All ER 252 at 269, who said that ‘[t]
he combination of the increase in heavy litigation conducted by large teams of lawyers of varying experience 
and the indiscriminate use of photocopying has increased the risk of privileged documents being disclosed by 
mistake’ (para 48).
9 para 12. 
10 para 7. 
11 Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), s 56(1), footnote 3 of the judgment.
12 paras 7 and 58. 
13 para 6. 
14 The view of Bergin CJ in Eq was that if there was evidence that a mistake had been made (such as the 
classification of nine of the documents as both privileged and non-privileged), then privilege could not be said 
to have been waived, but without any such evidence that the reviewers had intended to claim privilege then 
any privilege would have been waived by the inadvertent disclosure (paras 16–18). Her Honour found that 
‘the reviewers’ belief, that they would not have formed the view that the relevant document was not privileged, 
was insufficient to prove that they had formed an intention to claim privilege’ (para 17), ordering the return 
of only those documents which had been listed twice. 
15 The test expressed by Campbell JA was whether ‘a reasonable solicitor in the position of [the solicitor for the 
Armstrong parties] should have realised that the documents had been disclosed by mistake’ (quoted at para 
25 of the High Court judgment). Absent any reasonable indication of mistake, there could be no obligation 
imposed on the Respondents to protect the confidentiality of the documents.
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Court emphasised the need for the courts (and presumably their officers) to take ‘a more 
robust and proactive approach’16 to achieving the broader dictates of justice. Here, that 
meant avoiding costly litigation about a side issue which detracted from the main issues in 
dispute between the parties and ‘offered little advantage to the Armstrong parties’.17 
Whilst the lawyers’ instinct was to adopt a zealous stance by refusing to return the 
documents,18 this approach had to be modified by the ethical imperative of cooperative 
resolution reflected in the UCPR.19 The High Court expressed its own disapproval of the 
Armstrong parties’ zealous challenge to privilege by ordering costs against them,20 and 
by approving the non-zealous approach to inadvertent disclosure reflected in Rule 31 
of the Australian Solicitors’ Conduct Rules. Indeed, the High Court thought that ‘such a 
rule should not be necessary’21 but is ‘an example of professional, ethical obligations of 
legal practitioners supporting the objectives of the proper administration of justice’22 by 
avoiding ‘unnecessary and costly interlocutory applications’.23 
The decision reminds of the need to take a less zealous and more pragmatic approach to 
resolving legal disputes. Where the issues in dispute are in essence side issues, and where, as 
in this case, the party seeking to take advantage of their opponent’s error gains no particular 
advantage from doing so, and no injustice results from returning the documents, then a 
more cooperative approach is appropriate. 
16 para 57. 
17 para 59. 
18 Marque Lawyers had not read the documents when they refused to return them, and they were of no particular 
advantage to the Armstrong parties (paras 26, 34, 59 and 62).
19 para 64. 
20 Despite the Armstrong parties’ having been relatively successful in the New South Wales courts.
21 para 66.
22 para 67. 
23 para 66. 
